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II. INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STATUTE 
United States v. Dinero Express, Inc. 
In United States v. Dinero Express, Inc., the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals was required to decide whether the remittance scheme, 
viewed as an entire process, qualifies as "transfer" under § 1956(a)(2), 
despite the fact no money was wired from the United States to the 
Dominican Republic. 17 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
holding stating that the actions of defendant qualified as a "transfer."18 
Defendant, Roberto Beras, was a co-owner and the Vice President 
of Dinero Express, Inc. which was a "licensed money remitter on behalf 
of customers in the United States to locations in the Dominican 
Republic and Puerto Rico."19 The operation questioned in this case 
involved transactions where the defendant would receive a five percent 
commission for accepting deposits from known drug traffickers and 
arranging the transfer of these deposits from New York City to the 
Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.20 The specific action involved 
the transfer of drug proceeds to the Dominican Republic using a four-
step process.21 First, money from the drug traffickers was delivered to 
Dinero Express, Inc. with gradual depositing.22 Second, Dinero 
Express, Inc. would create phony invoices to show that transactions 
were made to the Dominican Republic.23 Third, arrangements were 
made with an individual in the Dominican Republic to advance local 
currency in the same amount as the deposits being made in New York 
City.24 Finally, Dinero Express, Inc. would repay the local currency 
provider using a wire transfer of the funds on one occasion. 25 As a 
result, Beras was sentenced to a 292 month prison term, three years of 
supervised release, a $4, 100 mandatory special assessment, and an order 
of forfeiture of $10,000,000.26 
The international money laundering statute prohibits "individuals 
from engaging, with the requisite intent of knowledge, in the transport, 
17. United States v. Dinero Express, Inc., 313 F.3d 803, 806 (2d. Cir. 2002). 
18. Id. at 807. 
19. Id. at805. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Dinero, 313 F.3d at 805. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
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transmittal, or transfer, or attempt to transport, transmit, or transfer of a 
monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States to or 
through a place outside the United States from or through a place 
outside the United States".27 
Defendant makes the argument that because not one of the 
individual steps involved the direct wiring of money from the United 
States to a place outside of the United States, a "transfer" did not occur 
which would fall into the meaning of §1956(a)(2) therefore claiming his 
convictions were improper.28 However, the Court of Appeals cites, 
United States v. Harris, 79 F.3d 223, 231 (2d Cir.), which held that a 
multi-step transfer would be examined as single event for purposes of 
§ 1956(a)(2).29 Therefore, this court concluded by analogy that the steps 
used by . Beras would be viewed as a single "transfer" under 
§ 1956(a)(2). The court notes that there is a "transfer" of money where 
it is accepted in one location and then pursuant to conduct, the money is 
caused to be delivered to another location. 30 
Therefore the Court of Appeals held that the conduct of Beras 
constituted a "transfer" for the purposes of §1956(a)(2) no matter 
whether the "transfer" was a single-step "transfer" or multi-step 
process.31 The court further argued that the conduct of the defendant 
allowed American drug traffickers to move money to the Dominican 
Republic.32 Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the trial court 
by upholding the convictions of Beras for international money 
laundering under 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(2). 
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27. 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(2). 
28. Dinero, 313 F .3d at 805-06. 
29. Id. at 806. 
30. Id.; United States v. Gi/boe, 684 F.2d 235, 238 (2d Cir.1982) (ruling that 18 U.S.C. 
§2314 covers electronic transfers of funds because "the manner in which the funds were 
moved does not affect the ability to obtain tangible paper dollars or a bank check from a 
receiving account"-i.e., "the beginning of the transaction is the money in one account and 
the ending is money in another"). 
31. Dinero, 313 F.3d at 807. 
32. Id. 
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